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ABSTRACT
A key issue in fisheries restoration is the speed at which recovery can occur, while still meeting the 
economic and social constraints which managers must deal with. This paper uses the viable control 
approach to examine fisheries restoration and study the tradeoffs involved with the selection of recovery 
strategies. We define sustainability as a combination of biological, economic and social constraints which 
need to be met for a viable fishery to exist. The set of states for which constraints are met, or viable states, 
is considered as the target for recovery of the fishery. The analysis is based on a discrete time bio-
economic model of the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery, with stock biomass and fleet size as the two state 
variables, and per vessel fishing effort and adjustment of fleet size as the two control variables. We 
address the particular optimal control problem of minimizing the time required for the fishery to recover 
from unsustainable states, under a minimum transition-profit constraint corresponding to the need to 
maintain a minimum level of revenue for vessels during the transition phase. We apply this framework to 
a historical crisis situation in the case study, and analyze various recovery paths with different transition 
profit constraints, including the historical path followed by the fishery.
Keywords: sustainable fisheries, multicriteria, recovery, bioeconomic modeling
INTRODUCTION
The multi-dimensional nature of sustainability is increasingly stressed as a key aspects of fisheries 
management. According to Cochrane (2000), primary considerations in fisheries management are 
sustainability of the resource base, economic viability and equity in access to the resource. When one of 
the ecological, economic or social objective is not met, fisheries face crisis situations. In particular, one of 
the reasons of management failure in fisheries is the conflict between ecological constraints on the one 
hand, and social and economic priorities on the other hand, the latter often having priority over resource 
conservation (Hilborn, 2007). Given this, analysis of options for the sustainable management of fisheries 
should rely on a multicriteria approach, as stressed by Charles (1994), and a challenging issue is to 
develop a framework of analysis which encompasses the diversity of sustainability objectives. Such 
approaches have been advocated by Mardle and Pascoe (1999) based on the use of multicriteria decision-
making methods. However, as stressed by Béné and Doyen (2000), a major drawback of multi-objective 
optimization is that it requires the identification and formalization of a function which embodies all the 
criteria, and which can then be maximized. The usual approach is to define a set of weights for these 
criteria in order to materialize the trade-offs between conflicting objectives (e.g., resource biomass, yield, 
revenues, employment, etc.). For example, Cheung and Sumaila (2007) describe objectives in fisheries 
management, and trade-offs in their achievement in a simulation framework, using arbitrary weighting 
factors for policy objectives. Such an approach implies choices regarding the weights attributed to the 
different objectives which are largely political. In practice, the problem of the regulator seems to be to 
cope with all the objectives pursued simultaneously without an a priori definition of their relative weight. 
The role of scientists may thus be to indicate the different decisions which can be adopted to satisfy all 
the sustainability requirements rather than to define the decisions optimizing a unique criterion: a case of 
‘satisficing’ behavior (Simon, 1957). One possibility is to characterize fishery sustainability using a set of 
indicators with thresholds defined as constraints reflecting the various objectives of fishery management. 
Sustainability would then be defined as the ability to keep the fishery within the specified set of 
constraints in the long-run.
The  viability  framework of analysis (Aubin, 1991) is particularly well-adapted to cope with such 
problems. This framework relies on the definition of a set of constraints that must be satisfied at any time 
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for the system to be said viable, and on the study of the consistency between the dynamics of the system 
and these constraints. This results in the definition of the so-called viability kernel of the problem, that is, 
the set of initial bio-economic configurations for which there are decisions that result in inter-temporal 
trajectories satisfying all the constraints. This framework has been used in Martinet and Doyen (2007) to 
study the sustainability of an economy with an exhaustible resource. The viability of bioeconomic 
systems with renewable resources is analyzed in Béné and Doyen (2000) and Doyen and Béné (2003). 
Cury et al. (2005) have advocated viability analysis as a relevant approach in the context of the 
Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries management.
According to recent studies, there is an increase in the proportion of overexploited marine fish stocks 
worldwide, and excess-fishing capacities exist in most fisheries (FAO, 2004; Garcia and Grainger, 2005). 
Hence, the problem of managing fisheries is increasingly cast in terms of restoring them to sustainable 
levels of fish stocks, catches, and revenues. Problems posed by fisheries restoration are dynamic in 
nature: beyond the issue of choosing adequate objective levels for restored fisheries, a key question is the 
identification and the selection of the possible paths towards these objective levels. While the viability 
framework defines sustainable exploitation configurations, it does not deal with recovery problems. 
Doyen and Saint-Pierre (1997) extend the viability approach to deal with such issues, defining the notion 
of minimal time of crisis. Martinet et al. (2007) use this notion to analyze recovery paths in bio-economic 
marine resource systems facing crisis situations. The authors compare a recovery strategy based on the 
minimization of the time of crisis to other possible strategies (historical path, Open access and Maximum 
Intertemporal Economic Yield). The minimal time of crisis strategy requires to shut down the fishery 
during the recovery process, which entails high short-term costs to fishing operators. If there are no 
alternative sources of revenue or employment available for fishers, such strategies are bound to generate 
extremely strong resistance, as stressed by Cochrane (2000). In practice, this may seriously compromise 
recovery strategies. A condition for the feasibility of a recovery program may thus be the limitation of 
economic losses by individual operators. Hence, recovery programs have two important dimensions: 
i) achieving sustainability objectives in a near future, and ii) defining a recovery path with acceptable 
costs to individual operators. There will necessarily be trade-offs between the speed of recovery and the 
social and political acceptability of the adjustments required for fisheries to be restored. This problem is 
not addressed in Martinet et al. (2007).
In the present paper, we address the issue of the restoration of fisheries facing crisis. More specifically, 
we address the trade-offs between speed and acceptability of recovery programs. The analysis is based on 
a bio-economic model representing the fishery dynamics, and the definition of a set of constraints 
describing sustainability boundaries for the fishery. The objective of the social planner is to keep the 
fishery within these boundaries in the long-run. The fishery will be said to face crisis if this objective is 
not met. Three categories of constraints are considered: biological, economic and social, without giving 
priority to any one dimension over the others (Polasky et al., 2005; Groot et al., 2007). We use viable 
control analysis to identify the set of initial states of the fishery from which it is possible to satisfy these 
constraints dynamically. We consider the problem faced by a social planner who seeks to recover the 
fishery when it is not initially in that set of states. We treat this problem as a particular optimal control 
problem in which the social objective is to minimize the duration of crisis, under constraints related to the 
acceptability of transition costs. We define transition costs as the costs faced by individual operators due 
to the implementation of a recovery program, which cannot be higher than a given acceptable level. By 
conducing sensitivity analysis on this level, we quantify trade-offs between the duration of crisis and the 
acceptability of recovery programs. To illustrate the general problem, we propose an application of the 
analysis to a discrete time bio-economic model, with two state variables (resource stock biomass and fleet 
size), and two control variables (per vessel fishing effort and fleet adjustment speed). The analysis is 
applied to a simplified representation of the Bay of Biscay (ICES area VIIIa,b) nephrops fishery, and to 
recovery paths from a historical crisis situation. Based on our general framework, we compare various 
recovery paths to the observed evolution of the fishery. 
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RECOVERING SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES
Bioeconomic model
We consider a single stock fishery, characterized for each year t by two state variables: the biomass Bt of 
the exploited resource stock, and the size of the fleet Kt. The dynamics of the bio-economic system are 
driven by two control variables: fishing effort et (days at sea per period and per vessel), and change in 
fleet size xt (number of boats entering or exiting the fleet).
We use a discrete time version of the “logistic model” (Schaefer, 1954) to represent the growth of the 
resource stock:
R(Bt)=r Bt (1-Bt / Bsup)                                                                 (1)
where Bsup is the carrying capacity of the ecosystem for the resource stock, and r its intrinsic growth rate.
The fleet is assumed homogeneous. Each vessel has the same access to the resource and the same 
technical characteristics. Total catches are defined by
Ct = q Bt et Kt                                                                           (2)
where q represents the catchability of the resource.
Combining eq. (1) and (2), the dynamics of the resource is
Bt+1 = Bt + R(Bt) - Ct = Bt + r Bt (1-Bt / Bsup) - q Bt et Kt                             (3)
The economic status of the fleet is characterized by per vessel profit, depending on landings Lt of the 
resource defined with respect to the per vessel catches ct=Ct/Kt=q Bt et and a discard rate τ:
Lt = (1- τ ) q Bt et                                                                        (4)
Based on these landings, gross return associated to the targeted species is defined as a part λ of the 
vessel's total gross return (we consider that the gross return generated by other species in the fishery is 
proportional to the gross return generated by the targeted species). Vessel profit, defined as gross return 
minus costs, thus reads
π(Bt,et)=p (1-τ) q Bt et /λ – (wf  + wv  et )                                                  (5)
where p is an exogenous resource price that is considered constant. wf represents fixed costs and wv a  per 
effort unit variable cost related to catches and landings. Thus defined, fleet profit represents the 
remuneration of production factors (capital and labor) at vessel level.
The production structure is assumed to be slowly flexible, in terms of both capital and labor. The size of 
the fleet evolves according to a decision control xt:
Kt+1=Kt + xt                                                                            (6)
A degree of capital inertia is assumed to exist in the fishery. Due to technical and regulatory constraints, a 
maximum number xsup of vessels can enter the fishery in any time period. Also, the number of vessels 
exiting the fleet in any time period can not exceed xinf, due to social and political constraints which can 
be established based on the recent history of fleet evolution (Thébaud et al., 2006). We take this capital 
inertia into account by imposing condition xinf ≤ x ≤ xsup.
On the other hand, fleet activity (effort per period et) can change, and even be set to nil. Moreover, the 
effort is bounded by a maximum number of days at sea per period esup. Hence the technical constraint on 
vessel effort reads 0 ≤ et ≤ esup.
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Sustainability defined as a set of viability constraints
Hilborn (2007) explores the nature of fisheries management objectives. According to this author, these 
belong to four major categories: biological, economic, social and political. The first (and oldest) is the 
biological objective to preserve stocks and ecosystems and maximize their productivity (Maximum 
Sustainable Yield). The second is the economic objective of maximizing rents (Maximum Economic 
Yield).   The   third   encompasses   social   issues   such   as   employment   and   income  distribution,   and 
maintenance of traditional communities, which Hilborn terms Maximum Job Yield. The fourth concerns 
the political dimension of fishery management of avoiding conflict, which is usually implicit.
Based on this typology of management objectives, following Martinet et al. (2007), we propose to define 
the sustainability of the fishery by a set of biological, economic and social viability constraints. We then 
introduce a political constraint, which relates to the social acceptability of policies designed to maintain 
or restore a sustainable fishery.
The economic constraint is defined, in a micro-economic perspective, with respect to vessel profit which 
must cover the opportunity costs of the production factors (capital, labour, fishing rights) for the fishing 
unit to be economically viable (Hannesson, 2007). Hence, profit per vessel is required to be greater than a 
threshold πmin for economic units to be viable.
πt   ≥ πmin                                                                              (7)
In order to preserve the renewable resource and avoid depletion of the stock, the objective of maintaining 
the resource stock above a minimum threshold Bmin  is considered.
Bt ≥ Bmin                                                                             (8)
However, as proved in Martinet et al. (2007), the profit constraint (eq. 7) generates stronger limitations on 
stock size than the biological constraint (eq. 8). In particular, the minimum resource stock for fishing 
activity to respect the per vessel profit constraint (eq. 7) is given by
Bt ≥ B(π#)= (π#+(ωf+ωv esup )) /( p/λ (1- τ) q esup )                                 (9)
The social constraint is defined here as the preservation of employment and maintenance of fishing 
communities. For this purpose, we require the number of vessels to be greater than a threshold Kmin 
ensuring a minimum employment and activity in the fishery:
Kt  ≥  Kmin                                                                       (10)
Case-study: the Bay of Biscay Nephrops fishery
To illustrate our approach, the analysis is applied to a simplified model of the Bay of Biscay Nephrops 
fishery (ICES area VIIIa,b). In 2003, the fleet was composed of 235 vessels with an average profit of 
165,000 euros per vessel. The resource stock was estimated at about 18,600 tons. The average number of 
days at sea per vessel was 203. The total catches were estimated at 5,769 tons.
Based on available data, the minimum profit per vessel  πmin  (i.e. that ensuring remuneration of 
production factors at their opportunity costs) was estimated at 130,000 euros per year. This level has been 
established by studying the 2003 data of the Ifremer economic surveys. The minimum stock size Bmin 
was fixed at 5,000 tons. The minimal fleet size  Kmin  was arbitrarily fixed at 100 vessels, and the 
maximum speed of entry/exit of vessels in the fleet (respectively xsup and xinf ) at 5 vessels per year, 
based on observed fleet adjustment speed in normal years (i.e. in the absence of major publicly supported 
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vessel buyback schemes).
Viability constraints were thus met in year 2003. However, in the early 90's, the resource stock decreased, 
and the associated per-vessel profit dropped below the economic viability constraint. The estimated 
resource stock reached its lowest level in 1994, at about 14,000 tons, and the per-vessel profit was of 
78,000 euros. The fishery thus faced a crisis period (at least from an economic point of view), from which 
it appears to have recovered since. For illustrative purposes, we will define recovery processes for that 
fishery, from the 1994 bioeconomic state, applying our analytical framework.
VIABILITY AND CRISIS OF THE FISHERY
In this section, we use the viability framework to define the configurations of the fishery that are 
sustainable in the sense that they make it possible to satisfy all the viability constraints in the long run. 
We then characterize the fishery with respect to its capacity to avoid crisis situation, i.e. situations where 
at least one of the viability constraints is not met. Lastly, we develop a framework based on the minimal 
time of crisis to define recovery paths from crisis situations.
Viable exploitation configurations
The purpose of viability theory (Aubin, 1991) is to define the states of a dynamic system from which start 
viable trajectories, i.e. trajectories that respect the viability constraints dynamically. In our framework, it 
consists to define the configurations of the fishery (Stock biomass B, fleet size K and effort per vessel) 
associated with long run sustainable exploitation patterns. By definition, this excludes initial states from 
which the only possible trajectories, although satisfying viability constraints in the short term, will not do 
so in the long-run, given the system’s dynamics and its inertia.
The set of viable states is called the viability kernel of the problem. It is formally defined as the set of 
states from which at least one viable trajectory starts. From any state outside the viability kernel, there are 
no decisions that result in viable trajectories. Starting from these states, at least one of the constraints will 
be violated in finite time, whatever the sequence of feasible control decisions. The system will eventually 
face a crisis in some future period. The objective for a sustainable management program may thus be to 
stay within the set of viable exploitation patterns, or to drive the system back into this set by 
implementing a recovery program.
Crisis situations
We define a Crisis indicator I(B,K,e,x) which value is 0 if the viability constraints (7-8-10) are met for 
given state  (B,K)  and decision  (e,x), and  1  otherwise. We can also define the  Time of Crisis  of an 
intertemporal trajectory of the system as the number of time periods during which the viability constraints 
are not met along the trajectory. We denote this time T:
                         ∞                                                                                    
T(B(.),K(.))=   ∑  I(Bt , Kt , et , xt )                                                (11)
t=t0
A viable trajectory will have a nil time of crisis as the constraints will be respected forever. But if the 
system is initially outside the viability kernel, any trajectory starting from the initial state, including 
recovery trajectories, will have a positive time of crisis. A recovery program will thus imply facing a 
crisis for some time before recovering a viable system.
As stressed by Hilborn (2007) an implicit but important political objective in fisheries management is to 
avoid conflicts. When the fishery is in a crisis, as all viability constraints can not be met, strong conflicts 
will develop between stakeholders. Thus, pursuit by the social planner of the political objective will be to 
avoid crisis situations or, when crisis is unavoidable, to reduce its duration via appropriate recovery 
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programs. Moreover, as recovery programs require the violation of at least one of the viability constraints, 
this will result in additional conflicts. For example, in an overexploited fishery, a recovery program based 
on a fishing ban will face strong resistance from fishers due to the high individual cost of such a policy. 
As a result, the program may not be politically feasible. Thus, a realistic representation of recovery 
programs should include a formal representation of the acceptability of violating one or several of the 
viability constraints during transition phases.
The minimal time of crisis
Among all trajectories (B(.),K(.)) starting from a given initial state (B0 ,K0 ), one can define the trajectory 
with the minimal time of crisis, i.e. the intertemporal exploitation decisions  (e(.),x(.))  such that the 
associated trajectory starting from that initial state minimizes the time of crisis. A minimal time of crisis 
and the associated trajectory can be defined for any initial state. If the objective of the social planner is to 
reduce the time of crisis in a recovery program, this minimal time of crisis trajectory is the optimal 
recovery program. See Martinet et al. (2007) for more details on the definition of minimal time of crisis 
recovery paths.
The optimal program reads
min     T(B(.),K(.))                                                  (12) 
  (e(.),x(.))
In the present analysis, we are interested in the characteristics of recovery paths, and postulate that among 
all such paths, only some are politically acceptable, whatever the associated speed of recovery, as others 
imply costs to individual operators which are too high. We are thus interested in the definition of recovery 
paths under restrictive conditions on the transition period. To illustrate this particular problem, we 
introduce a transition profit threshold   πtrans  that corresponds to the lowest acceptable profit for 
individual fishers during the transition phase:
πt  ≥  πtrans                                                                      (13)
Such a constraint represents the fact that, although the optimal recovery strategy would require 
temporarily closing the fishery (Clark, 1985, Martinet et al., 2007), this is not always possible because it 
neglects fisher's needs to cover some fixed costs or to ensure a minimum activity and revenue. One may 
thus  require  a   minimum  activity  during  the  transition  phase,   or  more   specifically,  a  minimum 
remuneration of labor and capital, even if this is lower than the minimum viable profit, i.e.  πtrans < 
πmin .
Hence, we can define a concept of  minimum time of crisis under constraint.  From any initial state 
(B0,K0), one can define the intertemporal decisions (e(.),x(.)) resulting in a trajectory (B(.),K(.)) that 
minimizes the time of crisis (optimization problem 12) under the minimal profit constraint (13). As it is 
possible to compute the minimal time of crisis associated to any initial state, it is possible to draw the map 
of minimal times of crisis in the state space (B,K). In particular, the viable trajectories evolving in desired 
configurations of the bioeconomic system corresponds to a 0 minimum time of crisis. This means that 
computing the minimal time of crisis for all possible states will also define the viable configurations of 
the fishery (the viability kernel). More generally, using this notion of minimum time of crisis we are able 
to define the notion of viability at scale t, which is the set composed of all states for which the minimum 
time of crisis is lower than or equal to t. Considering the threshold πtrans as a parameter allows to carry 
out sensitivity analysis on the value of the transition constraint: i.e. identify changes in the minimal time 
of crisis associated to changes in the minimum profit constraint level.
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Fig. 1 Maps of minimal times of crisis Fig. 1 represents the viable configurations and the 
minimal time of crisis for the fishery, under three 
levels of constraint on transition profit πtrans. The 
first map (Fig. 1a.) represents the minimal time of 
crisis with no constraint on transition profit, as 
studied in Martinet et al. (2007). The central white 
area   represents   the   viable   configurations,   from 
which there exists viable trajectories, i.e. trajectories 
with a nil time of crisis. Colored areas around the 
viability kernel correspond  to the sets of states 
associated   with   positive   times   of   crisis,   each 
successive area of darker color corresponding to a 
time of crisis of one additional time period. The 
further from the viability kernel the initial state is, 
the longer it takes to recover from a crisis situation. 
The second and third map represent the times of 
crisis corresponding to a recovery process under a 
strictly   positive   transition   profit   constraint:   the 
second   map   (Fig.1b.)   is   produced   with 
πtrans=30 KEuros;   the   third   map   (Fig.1c.)   with 
πtrans=110 KEuros. The black area on the left-hand-
side of the figures corresponds to states from which 
it is not possible to recover from the crisis situation 
given the transition profit constraint and the inherent 
dynamics of the fishery: bioeconomic states in these 
areas are associated with an infinite time of crisis, 
given the political acceptability contraint imposed 
on the recovery program. The higher the transition 
profit constraint, the larger this area. In other words, 
for any given initial state of crisis of the fishery, 
there will be a maximum constraint that can be 
imposed on minimum profit during transition phases 
for a recovery program to succeed in a finite time. 
Also note that, for any given initial state of crisis of 
the fishery, an increase in this transition constraint 
will increase the duration of the crisis. This can be 
observed by comparing the position of the same 
initial state with respect to times of crisis in maps (b) 
and (c). Any given state belongs to an area of the 
map characterized by an equal or higher minimum 
time of crisis when the guaranteed transition profit 
increases.
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ANALYSIS OF TRADE-OFFS IN SELECTING RECOVERY PROGRAMS
Given these definitions, we use the concept of minimum time of crisis under constraint to study recovery 
processes from crisis situations. For illustrative purposes, we compute the minimal time of crisis for a 
range of transition profit constraint from the 1994 state of the Bay of Biscay Nephrops fishery, and 
compare associated recovery paths to the historical trajectory.
Theoretical recovery paths from a historical crisis situation
The simplified model of the nephrops fishery indicates that it was in a critical situtation in 1994 as 
regards the economic status of vessels. Based on the analysis above, we can compute various possible 
recovery trajectories from this initial state, and compare these to the estimated historical path which is 
used as a benchmark. In particular, we can calculate the recovery path associated with the minimal time 
of crisis with no constraint on transition profit, as well as paths where such a constraint is imposed. We 
compute paths where minimum profit during the transition phase is assumed to be 50, 80, 90 or 
100 KEuros. The paths followed by the fishery under each of these assumptions are represented in Fig.2.
The trajectories presented in Fig.2 can be interpreted as follows:
Recovering viable levels of profit with a minimal time of crisis involves reductions in fleet size. The 
required fleet adjustment is the same whatever the constraint on transition profit, as the social planner will 
make the most of the fleet adjustments which are made possible given capital inertia in the fishery. 
Transition also requires a reduction of the fishing effort of vessels in the fishery. With lower reductions of 
effort, transition profit will be maintained at higher levels, but transition time will be longer. Overall, the 
comparison of simulated trajectories with the estimated historical path of the fishery shows that strategies 
designed to minimize the time of crisis lead to adjustments which are less severe than those effectively 
observed: the reduction in fleet size was stronger in practice than in the simulated scenarios; and while the 
reduction of fishing effort per vessel was associated to levels of individual profit comparable to those 
which would have been observed with the simulated paths involving constraints on the transition phase, 
this reduction lasted longer than required by our simulated recovery strategies, leading to higher profit 
levels towards the end of the period. The observed recovery path for this fishery thus violated the 
constraints as they have been specified in the present analysis, more than the simulated recovery 
strategies identified would have. In practice, this was probably made possible due to the existence of 
public aids paid to vessel owners, particularly via the implementation of a buyback scheme.
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Fig. 2: Recovery trajectories from 1994 crisis situation in the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery
Computing the recovery paths associated to different values of the constraint on transition profit, and 
calculating the time required from the initial state of crisis (1994) to reach a viable exploitation pattern by 
each path, we can quantify the trade-offs that exist between the level of guaranteed profit during the 
transition phase, and the time needed to recover a sustainable fishery. Fig.3 represents this trade-off. The 
greater the profit during transition the longer the transition time; also, there is a maximal transition profit 
constraint beyond which no recovery path for the fishery exists (transition time tends to infinity with the 
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constraint on transition profit tending towards a finite value).
Fig. 3: Minimal time of crisis with respect to transition profit constraint πtrans
CONCLUSION
It has become commonplace to describe the management of fisheries, as well as of other natural resources 
exploitation, as collective choice problems involving multiple objectives. In particular, a growing number 
of empirical studies stress the key role of political processes in explaining the observed policy choices 
and their consequences, and in discussing possible management scenarios. Hence, it appears essential to 
include such considerations in the formal description of the dynamics of resource systems and their 
control. The viability framework allows development of such an analysis, i.e. to consider tradeoffs 
between different objectives while taking into account the inertia of dynamic bio-economic systems. In 
this paper, we examine the viability of a fishery with respect to economic, social and biological 
constraints. The main constraint is a minimum profit per vessel that must be guaranteed at each time 
period. We use the viability approach to determine the set of bio-economic states that make it possible to 
satisfy the constraints dynamically. This set is called the viability kernel of the problem. Any trajectory 
leaving this set will violate the constraints in a finite time, whatever decisions apply. The system then 
faces a crisis situation.
We then study transition phases from crisis situations, i.e. from states outside the viability kernel, to 
viable exploitation configurations. These transitions phases are characterized by the time of transition on 
the one hand, and the cost of the transition on the other hand. This cost is defined as the difference 
between a minimum profit ensuring economic viability and the guaranteed profit during the transition 
phase. We show that if a constraint is imposed on acceptable transition costs, this will entail longer 
transition phases. The reciprocal interpretation of this result is that short transition phases may not be 
feasible, due to the fact that they entail unacceptable short-term costs to individual operators in the 
fishery. The problem of the social planner in selecting recovery paths can thus be cast in terms of 
choosing to reduce speed in order to satisfy short term requirements, with a risk that recovery may not be 
possible in finite time, or to make progress at the quickest possible speed, but with the risk that obstacles 
along the way will lead to failure in achieving recovery objectives.
To illustrate these theoretical results, we compute recovery paths from the historical crisis of 1994 in the 
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Bay of Biscay Nephrops fishery, based on a simple bio-economic model. We compare simulated recovery 
paths with the estimated historical path, and show that the observed transition actually involved more 
severe adjustments than those which could have been adopted, which is probably due to the fact that 
significant public aids were devoted to the adjustment of fleet capacity in France during the period 
studied.
The approach developed in this paper thus allows to identify a set of sustainable states for a fishery in a 
multi-objective perspective, and to examine possible transition phases from unsustainable to sustainable 
states. A key result of the analysis is the formal identification of the degree of compatibility between 
different constraints imposed on the management of a fishery and the dynamics of the bio-economic 
system. Within these sets of states and transition phases, there is potential room for additional research 
regarding the preferred options, and trade-offs between the different objectives pursued by managers. In 
particular, the inclusion of costs associated to the implementation of plans designed to alleviate 
transitional impacts to individual operators should allow a cost-benefit analysis of management strategies 
to be carried out. Also, the inclusion of uncertainty in the dynamics of bio-economic systems may lead to 
modified conclusions as regards the trade-offs between speed and cost of recovery.
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